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91-5771.ZS
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WADE v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 91-5771. Argued March 23, 1992-Decided May 18, 1992
After his arrest on, inter alia, federal drug charges, petitioner Wade
gave law enforcement officials information that led them to arrest
another drug dealer. Subsequently, he pleaded guilty to the charges,
and the District Court sentenced him to the 10-year minimum
sentence required by 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B) and the United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (USSG). The court
refused Wade's request that his sentence be reduced below the
minimum to reward him for his substantial assistance to the Govern-
ment, holding that 18 U.S.C. 3553(e) and USSG 5K1.1 empower
the district courts to make such a reduction only if the Government
files a motion requesting the departure. The Court of Appeals
affirmed, rejecting Wade's arguments that the District Court erred in
holding that the absence of a Government motion deprived it of the
authority to reduce his sentence and that the lower court was
authorized to enquire into the Government's motives for failing to file
a motion.
Held:
1.Federal district courts have the authority to review the Govern-
ment's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a
remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional
motive. Since the parties assume that the statutory and Guidelines
provisions pose identical and equally burdensome obstacles, this
Court is not required to decide whether 5K1.1 ``implements'' and
thereby supersedes 3553(e) or whether the provisions pose separate
obstacles. In both provisions, the condition limiting the court's
authority gives the Government a power, not a duty, to file a sub-
stantial-assistance motion. Nonetheless, a prosecutor's discretion
when exercising that power is subject to constitutional limitations
that district courts can enforce. Thus, a defendant would be entitled
to relief if the prosecution refused to file a motion for a suspect
reason such as the defendant's race or religion. However, neither a
claim that a defendant merely provided substantial assistance nor
additional but generalized allegations of improper motive will entitle
a defendant to a remedy or even to discovery or an evidentiary
hearing. A defendant has a right to the latter procedures only if he
makes a substantial threshold showing of improper motive. Pp.3-4.
2.Wade has failed to raise a claim of improper motive. He has
never alleged or pointed to evidence tending to show that the Govern-
ment refused to file a motion for suspect reasons. And he argues to
no avail that, because the District Court erroneously believed that no
impermissible motive charge could state a claim for relief, it thwarted
his attempt to show that the Government violated his constitutional
rights by withholding the motion arbitrarily or in bad faith. While
Wade would be entitled to relief if the prosecutor's refusal to move
was not rationally related to any legitimate Government end, the
record here shows no support for his claim of frustration, and the
claim as presented to the District Court failed to rise to the level
warranting judicial enquiry. In response to the court's invitation to
state what evidence he would introduce to support his claim, Wade
merely explained the extent of his assistance to the Government.
This is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for relief, because
the Government's decision not to move may have been based simply
on its rational assessment of the cost and benefit that would flow
from moving. Pp.5-6.
936 F.2d 169, affirmed.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.